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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Mr. Jones appeals from his judgment of conviction for attempted strangulation, arguing
the prosecutor committed misconduct rising to the level of fundamental error when he made
multiple comments in closing argument that were factually inaccurate, and insinuated that
Mr. Jones and his attorney were fabricating a defense and committing/suborning perjury.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. Jones included a statement of facts and course of proceedings in his Appellant’s
Brief, which he relies on and incorporates herein.  (See Appellant’s Br., pp.1-3.)  The State




Did the prosecutor commit misconduct by insinuating, in his closing argument, that Mr. Jones
and his attorney were fabricating a defense and committing/suborning perjury, and, if so, did this
misconduct constitute fundamental error requiring reversal of Mr. Jones’ conviction?
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ARGUMENT
The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct By Insinuating, In His Closing Argument, That
Mr. Jones And His Attorney Were Fabricating A Defense And Committing/Suborning Perjury,
And This Misconduct Constituted Fundamental Error Requiring Reversal Of Mr. Jones’
Conviction
In its Respondent’s Brief, the State mischaracterizes one of the most critical facts in this
appeal, relating to the prosecutor’s reference to an hour-and-a-half break in the proceedings as a
chance for the defense “to try to fix” its case, and also misconstrues Mr. Jones’ appeal as
challenging only this statement.  The prosecutor committed misconduct through multiple
statements he made in his closing argument, and the misconduct constituted fundamental error
warranting a reversal of Mr. Jones’ conviction.
The State asserts in its Respondent’s Brief that “the state argued in closing that Jones was
not credible, and characterized the gap in time from the initial testimony to the redirect testimony
as defense counsel’s ‘chance to try to fix’ things, to which Jones had no objection.”
(Respondent’s Br., p.2 (citing 1/11/17 Tr., p.111, L.8 – p.112, L.16.)).  The prosecutor’s
reference to the “hour and a half” gap in time was not a reference to the time from Mr. Jones’
initial testimony to his testimony on redirect, as there was no hour-and-a-half break during that
period of the trial.  (R., pp.125-26.)  Instead, the prosecutor could only have been referring to the
hour-and-a-half break that occurred after the defense had rested, which could not possibly have
presented a chance for the defense to “fix” anything.
In his closing argument, the prosecutor discussed Mr. Jones’ testimony on cross-
examination that he never put his hands on a woman’s neck.  (1/11/17 Tr., p.110, L.15 – p.111,
L.7.)  The prosecutor then said:
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And then the phone call.  You remember that?  You remember maybe a little
excitement in the courtroom?  You guys had to leave for a little bit.1  And then
you heard the call . . . .  And then [defense counsel] had his chance to try to fix
that, after, of course, an hour and a half break.  We introduced the evidence.  We
break for an hour and a half, what do you know?
(1/11/17 Tr., p.111, Ls.8-18.)  The court minutes of the trial reflect that Mr. Jones testified on
direct examination from 9:44 a.m. to 10:12 a.m.  (R., p.125.)  Cross-examination began at 10:13
a.m., and the audio recording of the call between Mr. Jones and his mother was played at some
point after 11:12 a.m.  (R., p.125.)  Defense counsel began his redirect examination of Mr. Jones
at 11:28 a.m.  (R., p.125.)  At 11:32 a.m., Mr. Jones “stepped down” and the “[d]efense rested.”
(R., p.125.)  The jury was excused for lunch at 11:33 a.m., and returned to the courtroom at 1:07
p.m.  (R., p.126.)
The prosecutor argued in closing, “We introduced the evidence.  We break for an hour
and a half, what do you know?”  (1/11/17 Tr., p.111, Ls.17-18.)  The prosecutor introduced the
audio recording at some point after 11:12 a.m., and the only break that occurred after that was
the hour-and-a-half lunch break, which occurred after the defense rested.  (R., p.126.)  The
prosecutor’s reference to defense counsel having “an hour and a half break” to “try to fix” his
client’s testimony was factually inaccurate and completely misleading.
The State asserts in its Respondent’s Brief that the prosecutor did not commit misconduct
in his closing argument “because closing arguments can challenge a witness’s credibility based
on evidence and evidence-based inferences.”  (Respondent’s Br., p.5.)  But the prosecutor’s
statements at issue went well beyond a challenge to Mr. Jones’ credibility based on evidence and
evidence-based inferences.  The statements at issue include the following:
1 The court minutes of the trial reflect that the jury was excused from 10:23 to 10:41 a.m. (18
minutes), and again from 10:49 to 11:12 a.m. (23 minutes), while the attorneys argued about the
admissibility of the audio recording.  (R., p.125.)
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∑ The prosecutor said, in closing, “And then the phone call.  You remember
that?   You  remember  a  little  excitement  in  the  courtroom”?   (1/11/17
Tr., p.111, Ls.8-10.)  The prosecutor’s reference to the “excitement in the
courtroom” suggests the phone call was new or surprising evidence; it was
not.
∑ The prosecutor said, in closing, referring to defense counsel, “One, he is
not giving you the whole story.”  He later said, “That’s the story they gave
you . . . .  And the state is more than welcome to attack his story.”  That is
what it is, a story.  Thought out, after quite painfully, it was pointed out
that he was not telling the truth.”  (1/11/17 Tr., p.111, L.24 – p.112, L.16.)
∑ In his rebuttal closing argument, the prosecutor said, in reference to
defense counsel’s theory that Ms. Kuba might have accused Mr. Jones of
pushing her because she was concerned about her medical bills:  “Well,
that’s  quite  a  theory.   That’s  quite  the  possibility  .  .  .  .   There  is  no
evidence to support his vague, imaginary hypothetical that [defense
counsel] has posited to you to bite on.  It’s his job.”  (1/11/17 Tr., p.150,
L.21 – p.152, L.2.)
These statements, along with the prosecutor’s reference to defense counsel having an hour-and-
a-half break “to fix” Mr. Jones’ testimony, constituted misconduct.  As explained by the Idaho
Supreme Court, “[c]losing argument serves to sharpen and clarify the issues for resolution by the
trier  of  fact  in  a  criminal  case.   Its  purpose  is  to  enlighten  the  jury  and  to  help  the  jurors
remember and interpret the evidence.” State v. Moses, 156 Idaho 855, 868 (2014) (citations
omitted).   The  prosecutor’s  comments  were  not  designed  to  help  the  jurors  remember  and
interpret the evidence.  Instead, they were designed to disparage the defense by suggesting that
Mr. Jones and his attorney were fabricating a story and committing/suborning perjury.
The prosecutorial misconduct in this case constitutes fundamental error as the
prosecutor’s comments were so egregious or inflammatory that the consequent prejudice could
not have been remedied by a ruling from the district court informing the jury that the comments
should be disregarded. See State v. Abdullah, 158 Idaho 386, 444 (2015) (stating standard for
demonstrating fundamental error during closing argument).  The State argues any error “would
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have been harmless” because, among other things, Mr. Jones was acquitted of one of the charges
against him, which is “wholly inconsistent with Jones’ theory that the purportedly ‘egregious and
inflammatory’ remarks prejudiced the jury against him.”  (Respondent’s Br., p.16.)  The fact that
the jury acquitted Mr. Jones of one of the charges against him goes to the show that this was a
close  case,  and  that  the  prosecutorial  misconduct  in  closing  argument  was  not  harmless.   The
jury obviously was not persuaded by the State’s evidence with respect to one of the charges.
Absent the prosecutorial misconduct, the jury could well have acquitted Mr. Jones of both
charges.  The State also faults Mr. Jones for failing to “cite any direct effects that the
prosecutor’s remarks had on the trial.”  (Respondent’s Br., p.16.)  To be clear, the direct effect
the prosecutorial misconduct had on the trial was the verdict finding Mr. Jones guilty of
attempted strangulation.
In State v. Sheahan, the Idaho Supreme Court considered whether the prosecutor
committed misconduct in commenting during closing argument that defense counsel had misled
and lied to the jury.  139 Idaho 267, 281 (2003).  The Court found the prosecutor’s comments
were improper, but held the statements did not constitute fundamental error because the
prosecutor “was analyzing the credibility of defense counsel’s evidence and the inferences that
defense counsel was making from that evidence.” Id.  Here, the prosecutor was not analyzing
the  credibility  of  the  defense’s  evidence  and  the  inferences  defense  counsel  was  making  from
that evidence.  Instead, the prosecutor was insinuating that Mr. Jones and his attorney were
fabricating a defense and committing/suborning perjury.  This was not permissible commentary,
and, on the facts of this case, rises to the level of fundamental error warranting a new trial.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, as well as those set forth in his Appellant’s Brief, Mr. Jones
respectfully requests that this Court vacate his conviction for attempted strangulation, and
remand this case to the district court for a new trial on that charge.
DATED this 22nd day of December, 2017.
_____________/s/_________________
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
8
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 22nd day of December, 2017, I served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF, by causing to be placed a copy
thereof in the U.S. Mail, addressed to:
HOWARD DEAN JONES
INMATE #122718
ISCI
PO BOX 14
BOISE ID 83707
RANDY J STOKER
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
E-MAILED BRIEF
GEORGE P ESSMA
ATTORNEY AT LAW
E-MAILED BRIEF
KENNETH K JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
CRIMINAL DIVISION
E-MAILED BRIEF
_________/s/________________
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
AWR/eas
